Expressing anger can signal that someone is certain and competent, thereby increasing their social influence-but does this strategy work for everyone? After assessing gender-and race-based emotion stereotypes (Study 1), we assessed the effect of expressing anger on social influence during group decision making as a function of gender (Studies 2-3) and race (Study 3). Participants took part in a computerized mock jury decision-making task, during which they read scripted comments ostensibly from other jurors. A "holdout" juror always disagreed with the participant and four other confederate group members. We predicted that the contextual factor of who expressed emotion would trump what was expressed in determining whether anger is a useful persuasion strategy. People perceived all holdouts expressing anger as more emotional than holdouts who expressed identical arguments without anger. Yet holdouts who expressed anger (versus no anger) were less effective and influential when they were female (but not male, Study 2) or Black (but not White, Study 3)-despite having expressed identical arguments and anger. Although anger expression made participants perceive the holdouts as more emotional regardless of race and gender, being perceived as more emotional was selectively used to discredit women and African Americans. These diverging consequences of anger expression have implications for societally important group decisions, including life-and-death decisions made by juries. Keywords anger, discrimination, emotion, gender, jury decision making, minority influence, persuasion, race, social influence, stereotyping Paper received 3 July 2016; revised version accepted 1 March 2017. 
Sanders as an emotional, raving candidate, while a buttoned-up Hilary comments, "it must be fun to scream and cuss in public . . . I have to put all mine into tiny little jars." These instances reflect frequent media speculation that women and African Americans might avoid appearing angry because they assume that doing so might diminish their power to persuade and influence others (Bruce, 2010; Cassidy, 2012; Groch-Begley, 2016) .
It is important to determine whether these assumptions are true given that attempts to avoid confirming stereotypes often result in women and African Americans underperforming relative to White men (e.g., Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Steele, 1997) . We conducted the first experimental test of whether identical expressions of anger indeed detract from credibility and influence for women and African Americans, but not White men, during a group decision-making task. We first review the limited research regarding the effect of anger expression on social influence as a function of gender and race (and their potential intersection). Next, we discuss two theoretical frameworks with the potential to explain these gender and race disparities in social influence: emotion stereotypes and perceivers' motivation to use anger expression as a justification for expressing their prejudice toward women and African Americans.
Anger Expression and Social Influence
Anger can naturally arise in group decisionmaking contexts due to passionate opinion or frustration with the persuasion process. Some even argue that the function of anger is to resolve social bargaining conflicts in one's favor (Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2009; Tooby, Cosmides, Sell, Lieberman, & Sznycer, 2008) . Expressing anger in a persuasion context signals certainty, conviction, and competence (Tiedens, 2001 ); all of which are important predictors of influencing others (Maass & Clark, 1984) . Expressing anger also signals threat, which motivates people to process a persuasive message more carefully (Calanchini, Moons, & Mackie, 2016) and to make more concessions during negotiations (Sinaceur, van Kleef, Neale, Adam, & Haag, 2011) .
Yet the persuasive power of anger expression might depend upon how appropriate it is for the social context (Adam & Brett, 2015; Adam, Shirako, & Maddux, 2010) . For example, anger expression increases concessions during negotiations (e.g., Sinaceur et al., 2011; van Kleef, van Doorn, Heerdink, & Koning, 2011) , but decreases compliance with donation requests (van Doorn, van Kleef, & van der Pligt, 2014) . Similarly, we predicted that the persuasive power of anger might depend on the expresser's gender and race. People draw inferences about others from the emotion they express (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; van Kleef, 2009; van Kleef et al., 2011) . The inferences people draw from anger expression might differ depending on the expresser's gender and race, which in turn might determine the effectiveness of that anger in influencing others during group decision making.
Anger Expression and Gender
There is some evidence that people draw different inferences from anger expression based on the expresser's gender. People perceive men as more competent, but women as less competent, when they express anger (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008; Tiedens, 2001) . These different inferences might be due to the fact that people attribute female emotions such as anger to internal causes (e.g., being emotional), but male emotions to external causes (e.g., having a bad day; Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009 ). Interpreting the same behaviors differently when performed by a man versus a woman can translate to gender differences in social influence (Kray & Thompson, 2004) . For example, female leaders are rated as less effective when they express anger compared to neutrality, whereas male leaders are rated as equally effective after expressing anger or neutrality (Lewis, 2000) . One study specifically demonstrated that when men and women made identical arguments during group discussion, expressing those opinions with anger (compared to no anger) created a gender gap in influence (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2015) . Although expressing anger (vs. no anger) made participants perceive both men and women as more emotional, that anger expression increased influence for men but decreased influence for women. Thus, we predicted that anger expression would decrease influence for women, but not men, during group decision making.
Anger Expression and Race
We extended the investigation of the effect of anger expression on social influence to African American expressers. There is only one investigation, to our knowledge, of anger expression and social influence as a function of expresser race. Among male negotiators, angry East Asian negotiators were more effective than angry White and Hispanic negotiators because the emotion stereotype that East Asians are not emotionally expressive led people to perceive their anger as a sign of genuine toughness and threat (Adam & Shirako, 2013) . Although there are studies demonstrating that people perceive anger more readily in African American faces relative to White faces (e.g., Hugenberg, 2005; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003) , there are no studies testing what effect those perceptions have on African Americans' opportunity to exert influence over others. Because there are no studies investigating African Americans' anger expression and social influence specifically, we drew from two theoretical perspectives to inform our hypothesis that expressing anger would detract from their influence (reviewed in subsequent sections): justification for prejudice and emotion stereotypes.
Anger Expression and the Intersection of Race and Gender
In line with "one-size-fits-all" critiques of research that assumes reactions to Black men will generalize to Black women (Sommers & Babbitt, 2010) , we tested the intersectional effects of race and gender. Although there are no studies testing this intersection in the context of anger and social influence, the more general literature regarding these intersectional effects is mixed. On the one hand, Black women might be penalized for expressing anger more than White women and Black men, due to their "double minority" status (Berdahl & Moore, 2006) . On the other hand, Black women might be penalized less than White women and Black men (Livingston, Rosette, & Washington, 2012 ) because they do not easily fit a salient stereotype (Goff, Thomas, & Jackson, 2008; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008) . It was therefore difficult to predict a priori the consequences of expressing anger for Black women. As a result, we focused our specific hypotheses on the moderating role of race and gender independently, but conducted a relatively exploratory test of their intersection in this context (i.e., whether reactions to angry Black men would generalize to angry Black women). Next, we review two theoretical explanations for why expressing anger will detract from women and African Americans' influence.
Anger Expression as Justification for Prejudice
Being perceived as emotional might translate to decreased social influence for women and African Americans because it provides a raceand gender-neutral excuse to discredit them. The justification-suppression model of prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) synthesizes contemporary prejudice models (e.g., Devine, 1989; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986) to assert that people still harbor prejudice, but are motivated to avoid blatant expressions of that prejudice. The model highlights suppression factors that reduce expressions of prejudice, and justification factors that facilitate expressions of prejudice. This model refers to racial prejudice, but the authors argue that it is also applicable to modern sexism and it has been applied to the study of gender prejudice (e.g., Ford, Boxer, Armstrong, & Edel, 2008) .
One justification factor is the presence of a non-race-related excuse for one's negative behavior toward a racial minority. For example, people judge a Black (vs. White) defendant more harshly only if they have nonracial reasons available, such as incriminating evidence (Dovidio, Gaertner, Penner, Pearson, & Norton, 2009) . Anger expression could serve as justification to discredit female or Black targets for a reason that is not based (explicitly) on their race or gender. In contrast, anger should not affect influence for White men because generally people do not harbor prejudice toward their group that is in need of justification. People might selectively use the perceived emotionality of female and Black targets as an excuse to discredit them and diminish their influence-an effect that would not apply to White men's identical emotion expression. We predicted, therefore, that for women and African Americans (but not White men), expressing anger (vs. no anger) would increase perceptions of general emotionality, which in turn would decrease social influence.
Emotion Stereotypes
Our prediction is also supported by the emotion stereotypes literature. A considerable body of research has investigated how emotion stereotypes affect emotion detection (e.g., Hess, Adams, Grammer, & Kleck, 2009; Hess, Adams, & Kleck, 2007; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; Philippot, Yabar, & Bourgeois, 2007) . We extend this research by investigating how emotion stereotypes shape reactions to unambiguous anger expression during group decision making. Specifically, women expressing anger might confirm the stereotype that they are highly emotional in general (e.g., Fabes & Martin, 1991; Johnson & Shulman, 1988) , suggesting that their emotion is internally caused (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009 ). Similarly, African American men expressing anger might confirm stereotypes that they are hostile and aggressive (Devine, 1989) . Although we are unaware of psychological research assessing emotion stereotypes related to African American women specifically, media depictions of the "angry Black woman" are frequent (e.g., Landsman, 2016; Pittman, 2016) .
If anger expression from these groups is interpreted as an internal emotional reaction detrimental to rationality, anger should decrease their credibility and influence. In contrast, people might be less likely to perceive anger expression from White men as indicative of an internal propensity for emotional overreactions. Because White male anger is perceived as externally caused (e.g., conviction about the topic being discussed) it might be less likely to detract from credibility. Thus, women and African Americans (but not White men) who express anger might be perceived as more generally emotional because they confirm emotionality stereotypes. Drawing on this theory, we again predicted that for women and African Americans (but not White men), expressing anger (vs. no anger) would increase perceptions of general emotionality, which in turn would decrease social influence.
We also tested a second possibility based on emotion stereotypes. Although women are certainly stereotyped as more emotional in general, stereotypes depend on discrete emotions. Women expressing fear confirms a stereotype, but women expressing anger violates a stereotype (e.g., Fabes & Martin, 1991) . Although we were primarily interested in anger, we also investigated fear expression to determine whether the effect is specific to anger or generalizes to fear (i.e., another negative emotion). Further, this comparison enabled us to tease apart whether women lose influence (a) when they confirm a stereotype that they are emotional (e.g., women expressing anger or fear), or (b) only when they violate a stereotype (e.g., women expressing anger but not fear) given evidence that people are often penalized for violating stereotypes (e.g., Brescoll, Dawson, & Uhlmann, 2010; Eagly & Karau, 2002) .
Research Overview and Hypotheses
The goals of the present research were to assess explicit anger and fear stereotypes based on race, gender, and their intersection (Study 1) and to investigate the consequences of expressing anger on social influence during group decision making (Studies 2 and 3) given that the interpersonal effects of expressing anger in a group context are a "blind spot" in the literature (Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008) . We utilized a computer-mediated mock jury deliberation task in which participants read several rounds of prescripted deliberation comments, but were led to believe that these comments were made live by other participants in their group. This scripted interaction always included one "holdout" juror who disagreed with the participant and four other members of the group who agreed with the participant. This enabled us to manipulate the holdout's anger expression, gender, and race, while holding their contributions to the discussion constant.
Both emotion stereotypes and prejudice justification literatures support the primary prediction of a moderated indirect effect: For women and African Americans (but not White men), expressing anger (vs. no anger) would increase perceptions of general emotionality, which in turn would decrease social influence (Figure 1 ). It is also theoretically interesting to pinpoint where exactly gender and race intervene in this process (i.e., the indirect effect). The emotion stereotypes framework suggests that gender and race would moderate the degree to which anger expression translates to increased perceptions of general emotionality (i.e., the a path; Figure 1 ). We predicted that this effect would be stronger for groups stereotyped as emotional (i.e., women, African Americans) compared to groups who are not (i.e., White men). The prejudice justification literature suggests that gender and race might moderate whether perceived emotionality is used as a justification to decrease social influence (i.e., the b path; Figure 1 ). We predicted that perceived emotionality would decrease influence for groups toward whom people are motivated to justify prejudice (i.e., women, African Americans), but not for White men. Finally, we conducted an exploratory test of the intersectional effects of anger expression for Black women compared to all other groups.
Pilot Study 1: Explicit Emotion Stereotypes
Although women are perceived as more emotional than men in general (Fabes & Martin, 1991; Johnson & Shulman, 1988) , gender stereotypes about discrete emotions vary. People estimate that women express anger less frequently, but fear more frequently, than do men (e.g., Durik et al., 2006; Fabes & Martin, 1991; Hess et al., 2000; Plant, Hyde, Keltner, & Devine, 2000) . Despite frequent media representations of "angry Black man" (Blake, 2010) and "angry Black woman" (Walley-Jean, 2009) stereotypes, little empirical evidence of these stereotypes exists. Explicit racial prejudice predicts readiness to perceive anger in ambiguous facial expressions on Black (but not White) faces (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003) , which suggests the existence of racial emotion stereotypes. No research, to our knowledge, has assessed explicit and spontaneous content of emotion stereotypes about African American men versus African American women. Using classic stereotype-content methodology (Devine & Elliot, 1995) , we tested the hypotheses that (a) anger is more stereotypical for men than women, and for Black men than White men, and (b) fear is more stereotypical for women than men. We also conducted an exploratory test of whether emotion stereotypes about Black men would generalize to Black women. 
Study 1

Method
Participants. Participants were undergraduates from a subject pool (n = 88) and U.S. citizens from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (n = 201). M-Turk provides a national online panel that is commonly used in experimental psychology as a reliable data source (Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013; Rouse, 2015) and is more representative of a jury venire than are students (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010) . Participants were 62% women; 41% Asian, 40% White, 10% Hispanic, 3% African American; M age = 28 years (SD = 10).
Procedure and materials. All materials are included in Appendix A. Experimental instructions asked participants to report their awareness of emotion stereotypes regardless of their own personal beliefs (Devine & Elliot, 1995) . In a within-subjects design, participants completed two stereotype awareness items (anger, fear) about four target groups presented in a randomized order (i.e., White men, White women, Black men, Black women). Participants chose whether anger and fear-also presented in randomized order-were either ( . Thus, higher numbers indicated that the emotion was more stereotypically expected for the target group. After each block, participants completed a manipulation check by choosing the group about whom they just responded.
If a participant failed a block's manipulation check, we deleted that block (but kept the participant's other blocks with successful manipulation checks). We excluded 21 blocks (2%) overall; 18 participants failed at least one block. The manipulation check failure rate did not differ by target group, χ 2 (df = 3, N = 1,072) = .91, p = .82.
Results and Discussion
Due to our within-subjects design, we conducted two multilevel linear regression models (one for fear, one for anger) that included dummy-coded target gender and race as level-1 predictors, sample as a level-2 predictor, and all interactions. We followed up the interaction in the alternative pattern to confirm that anger was more stereotypical for Black versus White men. Participants reported anger as significantly more stereotypical for Black men compared to White men, b = 0.52, SE = 0.11, 95% CI [0.31, 0.74], t(937) = 4.74, p < .001. Participants also reported anger as significantly more stereotypical for Black women compared to White women, b = 0.86, SE = 0.11, 95% CI [0.65, 1.07], t(937) = 8.06, p < .001. Given that the interaction was significant, the simple effect of race was somewhat stronger among female targets relative to male targets. Thus, as predicted, expressing anger confirms stereotypes about Black men and Black women, but violates stereotypes for White women. Summary. Study 1 confirmed the predicted pattern of emotion stereotypes and revealed novel stereotypes based on race. Anger is less stereotypical for White women than White men, but similarly stereotypical for Black women and Black men. Conversely, fear is more stereotypical for White women than White men, but similarly nonstereotypical for Black women and Black men. This intersectional approach revealed that emotion stereotypes about Black men generalized to Black women. Finally, these results confirmed that a comparison between anger and fear expression is ideal to test the effect of stereotypical versus nonstereotypical emotion expression for female holdouts during a group decision-making task in Study 2.
Study 2: Gender and Emotion Expression
In Study 2, we tested whether women (but not men) are perceived as less influential when they express anger and/or fear. We scripted a fake computer-mediated mock jury deliberation, which the participants believed to be a real online discussion. The deliberation always included a dissenting "holdout" who disagreed with the participant and four other programmed confederate group members. We manipulated holdout characteristics in a 2 × 3 (Holdout gender: man, woman) × (Holdout emotion: no emotion, anger, fear) between-subjects design.
We tested our primary hypothesis that women would be perceived as more emotional when they express anger compared to no emotion (a path) and that perceived emotionality, in turn, would decrease their influence (b path). We predicted that this would not be the case for men. We also tested whether this moderated mediation effect would be due to gender moderating (a) the degree to which expressing anger (vs. no emotion) increased perceptions of perceived emotionality (i.e., the a path), (b) the degree to which perceived emotionality decreases influence (i.e., the b path), or (c) both. Finally, we included a fear condition to test whether the predicted effects were specific to women violating anger stereotypes.
Method
Participants. We recruited 266 online adults from the US via M-Turk; 56 participants (21%) were excluded for failing gender manipulation checks (n = 21, 8%) and/or a suspicion check (n = 37, 14%). Participants' likelihood of failing the manipulation check was not predicted by their own gender or race (White vs. non-White), bs ⩽ |−.28|, ps ⩾ .628. The remaining 210 participants were 63% female; 77.1% White, 7.1% Black, 4.8% Asian, 5.2% Hispanic, and 5.7% other; Mage = 30 years (SD = 11).
Stimulus materials. The 17-minute trial stimulus was developed from a real case of a man charged with murdering his wife (R. v. Valevski, 2000) and included opening/closing statements, witness testimony summaries, and pattern jury instructions. The trial evidence was presented via timed slides including text and pictures of evidence.
The mock-jury deliberation script included four rounds of comments from five "jurors" that simulated an online conversation with the participant. Comments originated from undergraduate participants' reported reasons for their verdicts in a prior study utilizing the same trial stimulus. Therefore, all deliberation comments were realistic representations of how real participants justified their verdict choices. All participants read a script in which four jurors agreed with the participant's verdict and one dissenting "holdout" disagreed with the group. Thus, there were two versions of the script (Appendix C): (a) participants who voted guilty read about four others also arguing for a guilty verdict and one holdout arguing for a not guilty verdict, and (b) participants who voted not guilty read about four others who were also arguing for a not guilty verdict and one holdout arguing for a guilty verdict. We collapsed across these two script versions because they were not theoretically of interest and because participants rated the holdout as equally persuasive in both versions, F(1, 207) = 1.93, p = .17, η p 2 = .01.
Manipulations. Participants were randomly assigned to "interact" with a holdout named JasonS (male) or AliciaS (female). The other usernames were gender/race-neutral. The first round of deliberation included no emotion statements. Beginning in the second round of deliberation we manipulated holdout anger by embedding angry statements into their deliberation arguments (e.g., "Seriously, this just makes me angry. . ."), similar to previous anger manipulations in negotiation studies (Adam & Shirako, 2013; van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004) . The anger condition also included capital letters and exclamation points in the holdout's arguments. We manipulated holdout fear by embedding fear statements (e.g., "Seriously, this stuff just freaks me out. . .") into the holdout's arguments. Thus, holdouts made the exact same arguments across emotion versions, but we manipulated the addition of unambiguous statements of emotion (Appendix C).
Measures
Perceived Influence Scale. Participants reported how trustworthy, influential, high in argument quality, likeable, competent, credible, persuasive, and rational JasonS/AliciaS was on 5-point scales from "not at all" to "extremely," which formed the Perceived Influence Scale (α = .90). Participants completed these measures about every group member to mask that we were interested in perceptions of the holdout specifically.
Perceived General Emotionality Scale. Participants also reported how emotional they perceived JasonS/AliciaS to be from "not at all emotional" to "extremely emotional" and the holdout's level of negative emotion from "no negative emotion" to "an extremely high amount of negative emotion" on 5-point scales. The items formed the Perceived Emotionality Scale (α = .77). Participants also completed these measures about every group member. This measure assessed general emotionality (as opposed to manipulation checks specific to anger/fear expression) to test whether expressions of specific emotions were attributed to general internal emotionality more for women than for men.
Manipulation checks. Participants reported how much the holdout expressed anger and fear on 5-point scales from "not at all" to "extremely." To assess whether the holdout names had the desired effect of signaling the holdout's gender, we asked participants to guess whether JasonS/AliciaS was male or female.
Suspicion check. Participants were asked several open-ended questions to probe for suspicion that the interaction was fake (i.e., "What do you think the study was about?" "Did you think anything about the study was strange? If so, please explain what you are thinking of and please be specific." "Do you have any other comments?"). Any indicators of suspicion that the interaction was fake constituted failed suspicion checks.
Procedure. Participants were instructed to play the role of jurors by reviewing trial evidence and reaching consensus on a verdict with five other MTurk workers via computer-mediated deliberation. In reality, each participant individually engaged in a prescripted deliberation; no participants actually deliberated with each other. Similar cover stories have been effective in research regarding anger expression in two-party negotiation contexts (Adam & Shirako, 2013) . This methodology enabled us to have experimental control (which is notoriously difficult to achieve in group decision-making studies) by holding all elements of the interaction constant while manipulating the dissenters' gender and emotion expression.
Participants viewed trial evidence and read jury instructions. Next, participants were told they were being randomly assigned to a group to try and reach a unanimous verdict. (See screenshots of the following fake "deliberation" procedures in Appendix B.) To start the deliberation process, participants chose a username. Next, they saw a spinning progress wheel while participants were ostensibly being randomly assigned to six-person juries online. After four seconds, participants were shown a list of their group members' usernames. Participants chose a verdict (Guilty/Not guilty) and wrote comments and arguments in support of their verdict for their group to read. Once they submitted their response, they saw the spinning progress wheel followed by six group members' usernames (their own username plus five prescripted usernames) alongside each group members' verdict and arguments. At this point, all participants saw that four other jurors agreed with their verdict, but one "holdout" juror chose a different verdict. After reading these verdicts and comments, participants submitted a second round of comments to the group. This procedure was repeated for four rounds with the holdout continuing to dissent from the group. During Rounds 2-4 the holdout expressed emotion according to the emotion expression condition. After four rounds, participants learned that the deliberation must end to ensure the study did not exceed the time covered by their compensation. Participants completed measures of their co-jurors' perceived emotionality and influence after being informed that their co-jurors would not see these responses, as well as suspicion and manipulation checks, and demographic information. Participants completed the study in 45 minutes, on average.
Results and Discussion
Emotion manipulation checks. Our emotion manipulation was successful (see Table 1 for descriptive  statistics and Table 2 for omnibus ANOVA statistics and effect sizes). The emotion manipulation had a main effect on perceptions of holdout anger and fear. Planned comparisons confirmed that participants perceived the angry holdout as significantly more angry than (a) neutral holdouts There was also a significant Emotion x Gender interaction on perceptions of holdout anger. Simple effects revealed that the emotion manipulation was indeed significant for both male, Table 3 and omnibus ANOVA results and effect sizes in Table 4 . There was a significant gender main effect: Participants perceived male holdouts as significantly more influential than female holdouts. The holdout Emotion x Gender interaction was significant (Figure 3) . 3 As predicted, the simple effect of emotion expression was significant for women, F(2, 203) = 3.15, p = .045, η p 2 = .03, but not for men, F(2, 203) = 1.00, p = .371, η p 2 = .01. Specifically, relative to when they expressed ) values for all effects that included more than two groups, as well as confidence intervals associated with these effect sizes. Because we calculated the partial eta squared values based on ANOVA F values, we followed recommendations to use 90% CIs rather than 95% CIs (for more detailed explanations for this recommendation see Lakens, 2013; Smithson, 2001) .
Perceived influence. See descriptive statistics in
gender moderated the effect of perceived emotionality on influence (the b path), b = 0.25, SE = 0.12, 95% CI [0.02, 0.49], t = 2.12, p = .036, but not the effect of anger expression on perceived emotionality (the a path), b = −0.19, SE = 0.32, 95% CI [−0.82, 0.43], t = 0.60, p = .547. Consistent with the prejudice expression justification framework, angry holdouts were perceived as more emotional than nonangry holdouts, but emotionality was selectively used to discredit only women (not men).
The hypothesis was also supported for fear expression. The indirect effect of fear expression (vs. no emotion) on influence through perceived ) values for all effects that included more than two groups, as well as confidence intervals associated with these effect sizes. Because we calculated the partial eta squared values based on ANOVA F values, we followed recommendations to use 90% CIs rather than 95% CIs (for a more detailed explanation for this recommendation see Lakens, 2013; Smithson, 2001) . Summary. Our hypothesis was supported: When women expressed anger or fear compared to expressing the same arguments without emotion, they were perceived as more emotional, which in turn decreased their influence. Despite the fact that the male holdouts were making identical arguments with the same emotion expressions (and were perceived as similarly emotional as a result), being perceived as more emotional did not decrease their influence. These results are in line with the justification of prejudice framework: Even though men and women were perceived as similarly emotional when they expressed anger and fear, that perceived emotionality gave people a non-gender-related license to discredit a woman's (but not man's) opinion. Of note, anger and fear were both used to discredit women, but men were not penalized for expressing fear. These effects rule out the alternative theory that holdouts would be penalized only when violating emotion stereotypes (i.e., women expressing anger, men expressing fear).
Study 3: Gender, Race, and Anger Expression
In Study 3 we investigated whether the detrimental effect of anger expression would also apply to African Americans, and whether gender and race would interact to enhance social influence disparities for an understudied group: African American women. Because the effects of anger and fear were similar in Study 2, we dropped the fear condition. Similar to the gender effect in Study 2, we predicted a moderated mediation pattern in which expressions of anger (vs. no emotion) would increase perceptions of general emotionality for all holdouts, which in turn would decrease influence for White women and African Americans, but not for White men.
Some research would suggest that Black women might be penalized less than Black men for expressing anger because their gender-and race-based anger stereotypes conflict, which might make the stereotype of angry Black women less salient. We found, however, that the anger stereotype was similarly salient for Black women and Black men in Study 1. Therefore, we predicted that Black women would be penalized as much as Black men for expressing anger-potentially more so due to their double minority status (Berdahl & Moore, 2006) . To test our hypotheses, we conducted a 2 (Holdout gender: man, woman) × 2 (Holdout race: White, Black) × 2 (Holdout anger: absent, present) between-subjects design.
Method
Participants. Participants were 236 undergraduates from a large Midwestern University. We excluded 79 participants for failing (a) the suspicion check (n = 13, 5.5%), and/or (b) failing to pass the race manipulation check-either by giving the incorrect answer (n = 46, 19.5%; a rate consistent with manipulation check failure norms [19%] ; Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013) or by not answering it (n = 25, 10.6%). The remaining 157 participants were 61% female; 27.4% Asian, 25.5% Hispanic, 20.4% White, 8.9% Black, and 8.3% other (9.6% did not respond); Mage = 20 years (SD = 4). Participants' likelihood of failing the race manipulation check was not predicted by their own gender or race, bs ⩽ |−.21|, ps ⩾ |.582|.
Stimulus materials, measures, and procedure. Participants completed Study 2 procedures and measures, which included the Perceived Social Influence Scale (α = .89) and the Perceived Emotionality Scale (α = .75). As in Study 2, participants rated the holdout as equally persuasive regardless of script version, F(1, 145) = 0.58, p = .45, η p 2 = .004, so we collapsed across versions for all analyses. There were three changes to the methodology. First, to increase the realism of the group interaction, the study took place in computer labs at the university with up to 20 participants per session. Participants were told they would deliberate with five other people from two different computer laboratories to prevent them from guessing which participants in the room were in their group. Second, the deliberation comprised seven rounds instead of four.
Third, holdout race was manipulated. We chose male names (Logan and Jamal) from the 20 "whitest and blackest names" based on 16 million children's names between 1961 and 2011 (Levitt & Dubner, 2005) . Jamal had been used to successfully manipulate race in past research (e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003; Stevenson & Bottoms, 2009 ). Because we had not previously manipulated race for female targets, we piloted female names with 49 M-Turk workers.
Participants answered an open-ended question, "What do you think the average American (regardless of what you personally believe) would guess the race of an individual named [target name] to be?" We picked names for which 100% of respondents assumed that the name represented a White woman (Emily) or an African American woman (Lateisha). We assessed whether participants in the main study believed the race manipulation by asking them to guess Logan/ Jamal/Emily/Lateisha's race as either White, African American, or other.
Results and Discussion
Anger expression manipulation check. See Table 1 for  descriptive statistics and Table 2 for omnibus ANOVA results and effect sizes. The anger manipulation was again successful: People perceived the angry holdout as significantly angrier than the neutral holdout. This effect did not depend on holdout race or gender. Table 3 for descriptive  statistics and Table 4 for omnibus ANOVA statistics and effect sizes. Consistent with Study 2, participants perceived male holdouts as significantly more influential than female holdouts. The predicted Race x Anger interaction was significant ( Figure 4) . 5 Participants reported that African Americans were less influential when they were angry compared to when they were not angry, Perceived emotionality. See Table 3 for descriptive  statistics and Table 4 for omnibus ANOVA statistics and effect sizes. Participants perceived angry holdouts as significantly more emotional than holdouts expressing no emotion. Participants also perceived Black holdouts as significantly more emotional than White holdouts regardless of anger condition. 6
Perceived influence. See
Moderated mediation model. Because we found that race moderated the effect of anger expression on influence, we tested whether the indirect effect of anger expression on perceived influence through emotionality was significant for Black, but not White, holdouts. Analyses with Hayes's PROCESS Summary. Our primary hypothesis regarding race was supported: When African Americans expressed the same arguments with anger compared to without anger, they were perceived as more emotional, which in turn decreased their influence. Despite the fact that White holdouts contributed identical arguments with identical anger expressions (and were perceived as similarly emotional as a result), perceptions of their increased emotionality did not decrease their influence. Consistent with Study 2, these results are in line with the justification of prejudice expression framework: Being perceived as emotional might have given people a non-race-related license to discredit African American (but not White) group members' opinions. Women were less influential than men regardless of whether they expressed anger-an issue we will address in the general discussion. Finally, similar to explicit stereotypes in Study 1, reactions to Black men expressing anger generalized to Black women.
General Discussion
The media often speculates about how women and racial minorities in prominent power positions, such as presidential candidates, the former First Couple, Supreme Court justices, and senators, strategically monitor their anger expression (Cassidy, 2012; Groch-Begley, 2016; Serwer, 2014; Swanson, 2014) . Our results provide the first experimental evidence that expressing anger detracts from Black, but not White, individuals' influence during group decision making-even when both are making identical arguments and are contributing identical expressions of unambiguous anger. We also found evidence that expressing anger and fear renders women, but not men, less influential relative to when they make identical arguments without emotion (Study 2). In Study 3, however, women were perceived as less influential than men regardless of whether they expressed anger.
Given the experimental control afforded by the study paradigm (i.e., all holdouts were making identical arguments via typed text), these effects cannot be explained by gender or racial differences in the content of targets' arguments, the style in which they delivered them, or the way they might sound or look when expressing anger. Instead, it appears that people had different reactions to anger based only on the assumed gender and race of the expresser. We extend previous findings that perceptions of emotion expression depend on context (e.g., Adam & Brett, 2015; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Stoppard & Gruchy, 1993) and the expresser's social group (Adam & Shirako, 2013; Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2015) by demonstrating that women (Study 2) and African Americans (Study 3) lose influence during group decision making by expressing anger, but men and White Americans do not. Although our studies were initially designed to focus on anger, this was also the first experimental demonstration, to our knowledge, that women (but not men) lose social influence for expressing fear.
Theoretical Explanations: Emotion Stereotypes and Justification of Prejudice Expression
Both theoretical frameworks predicted our primary finding that expressing anger decreases influence for women and African Americans, but not White men. The specifics of the moderation patterns, however, were more consistent with the justification of prejudice expression framework than with the emotion stereotypes framework.
Justification of prejudice expression. Several aspects of our results supported the explanation that negative emotion would provide an excuse to express prejudice toward women and African Americans. First, we found that expressing negative emotion (both anger and fear) was detrimental for women and African Americans, but never for White men-even when White men violated stereotypes by expressing fear. Second, despite anger expression leading to similar perceptions of emotionality for all targets, that perceived emotionality uniquely led to decreased influence for women (Study 2) and African Americans (Study 3)-perhaps because it provided a genderand race-neutral excuse to discredit them during group discussion.
Emotion stereotypes. Support for the emotion stereotypes explanation is mixed. Some results are in line with this explanation: People might have interpreted female anger and fear (Study 2) and Black anger (Study 3) as confirming emotion stereotypes that women are more emotional in general and that Black people are angry, which in turn might have detracted from their credibility. Other results, however, contradict an emotion stereotypes explanation: Men were not penalized for expressing a nonstereotypical emotion (i.e., fear) and gender and race did not affect perceptions of the holdouts' general emotionality. Further, the only other comparison-to our knowledge-of anger expression effects for different races (Adam & Shirako, 2013) found that Asian negotiators benefitted from violating emotion stereotypes by expressing anger. The effects of emotion stereotypes on social influence might not be as straightforward as in other domains where people are penalized for violating other types of stereotypes (e.g., Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004; Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004) . More research is required to understand which aspects of the social context determine whether violating an emotion stereotype will increase or decrease influence.
Gender and Race Intersectionality
Participants had similar explicit emotion stereotypes for Black men and Black women (Study 1), which is consistent with participants' similarly negative reactions to Black men and Black women expressing anger during group discussion (Study 3). Participants' reactions to Black women were more similar to Black men than to White women in both Studies 1 and 3.
Fully crossing race and gender also revealed interesting implications for the gender effect across studies. At first blush, it might seem like a contradiction that women were penalized for expressing anger in Study 2, but White women were not penalized in Study 3. Yet, a key difference exists: Race was ambiguous in Study 2, but unequivocal in Study 3. When information about more than one social category is available (i.e., gender and race in Study 3), attention to a dominant category can inhibit stereotypes associated with the less dominant category (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995) . Given that race cues capture attention faster and to a greater degree than do gender cues (Ito & Urland, 2003) , perhaps the holdout's racial identity in Study 3 inhibited gender stereotypes that affected influence in Study 2. Testing this explanation would be a fruitful avenue for future research. Of note, women were still seen as less influential than men in Study 3-but there was no further reduction in influence due to anger expression.
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions
The current research has several strengths. The methodology extends previous studies utilizing brief stimuli (e.g., three-sentence descriptions of a man/woman overreacting emotionally, Hutson-Comeaux & Kelly, 2002; 1.5-minutelong videos of job interviews, Tiedens, 2001 ) to a more involved and ecologically valid group decision-making context. Subtle gender and race cues led to very different reactions to anger amidst the myriad potential influences during group decision making. We extended previous investigations of anger and race in negotiation contexts to a cooperative task and to group decision making. Finally, these studies had enough experimental control to warrant causal claims while maintaining enough ecological validity to be relevant to jury decision making (e.g., including jury-eligible adults, all trial components, real jury instructions).
These studies also had limitations. Although this paradigm enabled tight experimental control as a first step, an important next step is testing whether these effects generalize to a less controlled, live interaction that takes into account nonverbal emotion expression. Recruiting large enough samples to test the interaction between expresser and perceiver demographics (e.g., gender, race) is important given that perceiver culture influences reactions to anger (e.g., Adam et al., 2010) . Further, our emotion expression was very unambiguous; the results might not generalize to more ambiguous emotion expression where emotion stereotypes might be more influential. Other important future directions include testing whether the results generalize across different gender/racial group compositions (e.g., Golding, Bradshaw, Dunlap, & Hodell, 2007; Lynch & Haney, 2011) , or prosocial emotions (e.g., Stoppard & Gruchy, 1993) . Additional research could also investigate ways to combat this phenomenon (e.g., calling awareness to bias, Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001 ; articulating external causes for anger, Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008 ; regenerating stereotypes, Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002) .
Finally, a relatively high percentage of participants did not pass the race manipulation check. Although it is possible that the manipulation was weak or the sample was not attentive, only 19% actually failed the check (which is consistent with M-Turk norms, e.g., 19%; Goodman et al., 2013) and an additional 10% refused to answer. These failures are likely due to social desirability concerns about appearing racist by admitting to having made race assumptions based on someone's name, given that (a) the names were used successfully in past research and were pilot-tested, (b) participants were significantly more likely to get the question wrong when the holdout was Black (n = 35, 15%) than White (n = 11, 5%), χ 2 (df = 1, N = 211) = 15.15, p < .0001, and (c) several participants spontaneously accused us of being racist for asking the question (e.g., "that's a messed up question to ask," "racist question I am not answering"). In short, prompting people to explicitly acknowledge race in this paradigm might conflict with their desire to appear colorblind (Norton, Sommers, Apfelbaum, Pura, & Ariely, 2006) .
Conclusion
We entrust very important decisions to groups with increasing value placed on diversity, which can breed frustration and expressions of anger. The results are most likely not surprising to women and African Americans who might often think that their impassioned arguments would have been more effective coming from a White man. These claims are often dismissed as paranoia or attributed to differences in communication styles. The current studies lend scientific evidence to the claim that identical arguments and expressions of emotion are less influential when coming from a woman versus a man, or from a Black individual versus a White individual. Our results also illuminated the reason: Although White men's expression of anger and fear resulted in attributions of emotionality to the same degree, these attributions were selectively used to discredit and decrease influence only for women and African Americans. These results have important implications for group decision making in everyday life-from legislatures deciding on policies to workplace groups deciding the trajectory of their departments. If expressing anger has such disparate effects on influence, gender and racial gaps in influence might be most likely to materialize in the decisions we are most passionate about in society, such as life-and-death decisions made by juries. 
